Description of the Career that I would like to have. Similarities Essay

Description of the Career that I would like to have. Similarities between Safeway Inc. and Exxon Mobil Company - Essay Example Apart from coordinating the sales promotion activities of the organization; the head of marketing department job requires passion and understanding of the organization’s business activities. Even though there are various similarities in the operations of this job, various organizations have differentiated this job description by incorporating some additional responsibilities in this department. The differences in the job description of the organizations may be due to the type of business, the number of employees in the organization, the company’s policies etc. For example, in Safeway Inc, which is a chain of supermarket business; the head of marketing department ensures that the various products of the supermarket are well marketed. This involves incorporation of various marketing strategies that is well suited for this organization such as good publicity. On the other hand, in an organization like Exxon Company; the head of marketing department has a wider responsibility of ensuring good sales for the various products. In Exxon, the staff at the marketing department must be well versed with the type of markets available for its products. Therefore, a career as th e head of the marketing department is not only involving but gives one a challenge to create new ideas that would be beneficial for the organization. ... provides a serene environment for the provision of experience and gaining of expertise in the marketing department. Training and promotion opportunities Safeway Inc. carries out various training programs to keep its employees well versed in its retail business. The training is usually done through seminars, workshops field trips etc. In addition, the company fosters team building by organizing joint activities that bring together workers from different departments. In terms of promotions, Safeway Inc. has a professional code that governs the job promotions of different employees. These promotions are done considering various factors such as the level of education, work experience, the performance of the employees etc. Compensation Compensation acts as a motivating factor for employees at Safeway Inc. because it promotes loyalty and improves their dedication to work. Work compensation are in the form of payment of overtime and giving allowances to employees such as house allowance, tr avelling allowance and medical insurance. Statement of corporate social responsibility â€Å"At Safeway Inc. corporate social responsibility is the core of what we do; we are committed to improving lives and communities† (Safeway Inc website) Job location The job in Safeway Inc can either be located in one of the supermarket chains or in its headquarters in California. However, employees are subject to job transfers as per the company rules and regulations. Company 2 – Exxon Mobil Company Brand of the organization Exxon Mobil Company is a multinational US based company that deals with oil and gas products. It also deals with lubricants, petrochemicals and owns various oil refineries in the world (Exxon Mobil website). Employment benefits A job at Exxon Mobil is an

Main Character Analysis - The Yellow Wallpaper Essay

Main Character Analysis - The Yellow Wallpaper - Essay Example THE CENTRAL CHARACTER OF THE STORY REPRESENTS AN ‘OUTSIDER’ WHO DOES NOT WANT TO CONFORM TO THE TRADITIONAL NORMS AND HENCE FREES HER SOUL FROM THE PRETENSE OF THE CONVENTIONAL WIFE WHO ABIDES BY HER HUSBAND’S DECISIONS WITHOUT INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT. Women have attempted to get rid of the conventional definitions of their roles and the ideology forced upon them, thus seeking for a redefinition of Womanhood. Charlotte Perkins Gilman illustrated the struggle of the female character of the story to overcome the patriarchal constraints in order to be able to cultivate her writing talents. Here she talks about the dominating care of her husband as she says, â€Å"He is very careful and loving, and hardly lets me stir without special direction†¦ There comes John, and I must put this away, --he hates to have me write a word. We have been here two weeks, and I haven't felt like writing before, since that first day. I am sitting by the window now, up in this atrocious nursery, and there is nothing to hinder my writing as much as I please, save lack of strength† (Gilman, 1891, 2) Gilman also points out the lack of cooperation from the female counterparts which have helped the male reinforce their dominance. She has mentioned the case of the sister of the woman’s husband in this regard. ... From the fact that John would not encourage her writing let alone appreciate them, she gradually suffered from low-self esteem. The following lines express her feelings, â€Å"But these nervous troubles are dreadfully depressing. John does not know how much I really suffer. He knows there is no REASON to suffer, and that satisfies him.† (Gilman, 1891, 3) The work represents the Cult of Womanhood, which ties up the women folk to the ambience of the home and family. Here the woman has been confined to the defined parameters that have been set by men. Constant domination negatively affects her creativity, as she has to put in the extra effort in order to overcome the mental set back and arouse the self-encouragement within her. The character Gilman creates in her story is an inspiration to all the women who have confined themselves within the shackles of dominance. She depicts the challenges thrown towards patriarchal ideologies and how women could move beyond the conventional ba rrier of ideology imposed upon them. She cites a reflection of this situation as she describes the changes in the wallpaper, saying, â€Å"There are things in that paper that nobody knows but me, or ever will. Behind that outside pattern the dim shapes get clearer every day. It is always the same shape, only very numerous.† (Gilman, 1891, 6) she wonders whether all women would be able to walk out of these artificial misleading designs created deftly by men – â€Å"I wonder if they all come out of that wall-paper as I did?† (Gilman, 1891, 12) The central character of the story ‘The Yellow Wallpaper’ therefore represents the ‘outsider’ to the set norms of the society

Discussion Board Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words - 7

Discussion Board - Essay Example It is actually at this point that the women begin acting as detectives. Mrs. Peters made inferences on a loaf of bread left in there, as well as on the possibility that Minnie Wright was actually preparing a quilt and that she was actually making nervous sewing patterns on it, which was a sign of a possible mental problem or anxiety. The rising action continues until the part where both female characters find an empty birdcage and finally a bird in the sewing basket whose neck was wrung. The falling action is the part of the play where the men return from their search while the women pretend not to know anything especially about the dead bird with a broken neck. The men still make fun of the women as they overhear them talking whether Minnie Wright was going to quilt it or knot it. The men thought that the women were just discussing trifles but what they did not realize was that it was the actually the most important piece of evidence they needed. Basically, it is the female characters’ actions and curiosity that advance the play’s plot. Had Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters not been curious or inquisitive enough, they would not have started looking around the kitchen among Minnie Wright’s things for anything that could satisfy their curiosity. This eventually led them to the bird with a broken neck. Moreover, the indifference of the men towards the women – by regarding them as merely interested in trifles – somehow helped advance the plot too, for, had they been different, they would have searched the kitchen first and the play could have ended there if they had found the bird

Learning Experiences 1 (Personal Training) Essay

Learning Experiences 1 (Personal Training) - Essay Example Its insertion is olecranon process of ulna. Intended action is long head, and exercise is skull crushers. Fourth is Biceps Brachii. Origin is scapula. Its insertion is tuberosity of radius and bicipital aponeurosis. Intended action is flexion of elbow and dumbbell biceps curl as exercise. Fifth is Anterior Deltoid, with the origin as anterior lateral third of the clavicle. Insertion is deltoid tuberosity on lateral humerus, intended action is abduction and flexion and exercise is dumbbell anterior deltoid raise. Sixth is Medial Deltoid. Origin is scapula, insertion is deltoid tuberosity on lateral humerus, intended action is abduction of the shoulder joint, and exercise is dumbbell lateral raise. Seventh is Posterior Deltoid with the origin as scapula, insertion is deltoid tuberosity on lateral humerus, intended action is abduction, extension and rotation while exercise is dumbbell posterior deltoid raise (Alcamo & Bergdahl, 2003, p.68). The eighth muscle is Trapezius, origin is the base of skull, insertion is the base of the scapular spine, intended action is elevation and depression, exercise is barbell shrugs. The ninth is Rectus Abdominis, origin is superior surface of pubis, insertion is costal cartilages, and intended action is depresses ribs, and exercise is crunches. Tenth is the External Oblique, origin is ribs, insertion is linear alba and iliac crest, intended action is flexes and depresses ribs, exercise is standing side twists. Eleventh is Gluteus Maximus, origin is illium and sacrum, insertion is the oblique ridge of the greater trochanter, intended action is the extension and rotation of hip, exercise is standing. Twelfth muscle involves Rectus Femoris, origin is anterior iliac spine of the illeum, insertion is patella, intended action is the flexion of hip, and exercise is leg extensions. The thirteen is the Biceps Femoris, origin is ischial tuberosity, insertion is lateral condoyle of tibia, intende d action is flexion

New Paradigms in the Study of the Civil War Essay Example for Free

New Paradigms in the Study of the Civil War Essay A civil war is a war between organized groups within the same nation state or republic, or, less commonly, between two countries created from a formerly united nation state. The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve independence for a region, or to change government policies. Civil wars since the end of World War II have lasted on average just over four years, a dramatic rise from the one-and-a-half year average of the 1900-1944 period. While the rate of emergence of new civil wars has been relatively steady since the mid-19th century, the increasing length of those wars resulted in increasing numbers of wars ongoing at any one time. For example, there were no more than five civil wars underway simultaneously in the first half of the 20th century, while over 20 concurrent civil wars were occurring at the end of the Cold War, before a significant decrease as conflicts strongly associated with the superpower rivalry came to an end. Since 1945, civil wars have resulted in the deaths of over 25 million people, as well as the forced displacement of millions more. Civil wars have further resulted in economic collapse; Somalia, Burma, Uganda and Angola are examples of nations that were considered to have promising futures before being engulfed in civil wars. Formal classification James Fearon, a scholar of civil wars at Stanford University, defines a civil war as a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies. The Correlates of War, a dataset widely used by scholars of conflict, classifies civil wars as having over 1000 war-related casualties per year of conflict. This rate is a small fraction of the millions killed in the Second Sudanese Civil War and Cambodian Civil War, for example, but excludes several highly publicized conflicts, such as The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the struggle of the African National Congress in Apartheid-era South Africa. That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention. That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the national territory. That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes only of the present Convention; or That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State. That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over the population within a determinate portion of the national territory. That the armed forces act under the direction of an organized authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war. That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the Convention. Causes of civil war in the Collier-Hoeffler Model Scholars investigating the cause of civil war are attracted by two opposing theories, greed versus grievance. Roughly stated: are conflicts caused by who people are, whether that be defined in terms of ethnicity, religion or other social affiliation, or do conflicts begin because it is in the economic best interests of individuals and groups to start them? Scholarly analysis supports the conclusion that economic and structural factors are more important than those of identity in predicting occurrences of civil war. A comprehensive studies of civil war was carried out by a team from the World Bank in the early 21st century. The study framework, which came to be called the Collier-Hoeffler Model, examined 78 five-year increments when civil war occurred from 1960 to 1999, as well as 1,167 five-year increments of no civil war for comparison, and subjected the data set to regression analysis to see the effect of various factors. The factors that were shown to have a statistically significant effect on the chance that a civil war would occur in any given five-year period were: Availability of finance A high proportion of primary commodities in national exports significantly increases the risk of a conflict. A country at peak danger, with commodities comprising 32% of gross domestic product, has a 22% risk of falling into civil war in a given five-year period, while a country with no primary commodity exports has a 1% risk. When disaggregated, only petroleum and non-petroleum groupings showed different results: a country with relatively low levels of dependence on petroleum exports is at slightly less risk, while a high-level of dependence on oil as an export results in slightly more risk of a civil war than national dependence on another primary commodity. The authors of the study interpreted this as being the result of the ease by which primary commodities may be extorted or captured compared to other forms of wealth, for example, it is easy to capture and control the output of a gold mine or oil field compared to a sector of garment manufacturing or hospitality services. A second source of finance is national diasporas, which can fund rebellions and insurgencies from abroad. The study found that statistically switching the size of a countrys diaspora from the smallest found in the study to the largest resulted in a sixfold increase in the chance of a civil war. Low per capita income has been proposed as a cause for grievance, prompting armed rebellion. However, for this to be true, one would expect economic inequality to also be a significant factor in rebellions, which it is not. The study therefore concluded that the economic model of opportunity cost better explained the findings. Population size The various factors contributing to the risk of civil war rise increase with population size. The risk of a civil war rises approximately proportionately with the size of a countrys population. Gleditsch et al. did not find a relationship between ethnic groups with polygyny and increased frequency of civil wars but nations having legal polygamy may have more civil wars. They argued that misogyny is a better explanation than polygyny. They found that increased womens rights were are associated with less civil wars and that legal polygamy had no effect after women’s rights were controlled for. Duration of civil wars Ann Hironaka, author of Neverending Wars, divides the modern history of civil wars into the pre-19th century, 19th century to early 20th century, and late 20th century. In 19th-century Europe, the length of civil wars fell significantly, largely due to the nature of the conflicts as battles for the power center of the state, the strength of centralized governments, and the normally quick and decisive intervention by other states to support the government. Following World War II the duration of civil wars grew past the norm of the pre-19th century, largely due to weakness of the many postcolonial states and the intervention by major powers on both sides of conflict. The most obvious commonality to civil wars are that they occur in fragile states. Civil wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries Civil wars through the 19th century to early 20th century tended to be short; the average length of a civil war between 1900 and 1944 was one and half years. The state itself was the obvious center of authority in the majority of cases, and the civil wars were thus fought for control of the state. This meant that whoever had control of the capital and the military could normally crush resistance. If a rebellion failed to quickly seize the capital and control of the military for itself, it was normally doomed to a quick destruction. For example, the fighting associated with the 1871 Paris Commune occurred almost entirely in Paris, and ended quickly once the military sided with the government. The power of non-state actors resulted in a lower value placed on sovereignty in the 18th and 19th centuries, which further reduced the number of civil wars. For example, the pirates of the Barbary Coast were recognized as de facto states because of their military power. The Barbary pirates thus had no need to rebel against the Ottoman Empire, who were their nominal state government, to gain recognition for their sovereignty. Conversely, states such as Virginia and Massachusetts in the United States of America did not have sovereign status, but had significant political and economic independence coupled with weak federal control, reducing the incentive to secede. The two major global ideologies, monarchism and democracy, led to several civil wars. However, a bi-polar world, divided between the two ideologies, did not develop, largely due the dominance of monarchists through most of the period. The monarchists would thus normally intervene in other countries to stop democratic movements taking control and forming democratic governments, which were seen by monarchists as being both dangerous and unpredictable. The Great Powers, defined in the 1815 Congress of Vienna as the United Kingdom, Habsburg Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia, would frequently coordinate interventions in other nations civil wars, nearly always on the side of the incumbent government. Given the military strength of the Great Powers, these interventions were nearly always decisive and quickly ended the civil wars. There were several exceptions from the general rule of quick civil wars during this period. The American Civil War was unusual for at least two reasons: it was fought around regional identities, rather than political ideologies, and it was ended through a war of attrition, rather than over a decisive battle over control of the capital, as was the norm. The Spanish Civil War was exceptional because both sides of the war received support from intervening great powers: Germany, Italy, and Portugal supported opposition leader Francisco Franco, while France and the Soviet Union supported the government . Civil wars since 1945 In the 1990s, about twenty civil wars were occurring concurrently during an average year, a rate about ten times the historical average since the 19th century. However, the rate of new civil wars had not increased appreciably; the drastic rise in the number of ongoing wars after World War II was a result of the tripling of the average duration of civil wars to over four years. This increase was a result of the increased number of states, the fragility of states formed after 1945, the decline in interstate war, and the Cold War rivalry. Following World War II, the major European powers divested themselves of their colonies at an increasing rate: the number of ex-colonial states jumped from about 30 to almost 120 after the war. The rate of state formation leveled off in the 1980s, at which point few colonies remained. More states also meant more states in which to have long civil wars. Hironaka statistically measures the impact of the increased number of ex-colonial states as increasing the post-WWII incidence of civil wars by +165% over the pre-1945 number. While the new ex-colonial states appeared to follow the blueprint of the idealized state centralized government, territory enclosed by defined borders, and citizenry with defined rights -, as well as accessories such as a national flag, an anthem, a seat at the United Nations and an official economic policy, they were in actuality far weaker than the Western states they were modeled after. In Western states, the structure of governments closely matched states actual capabilities, which had been arduously developed over centuries. The development of strong administrative structures, in particular those related to extraction of taxes, is closely associated with the intense warfare between predatory European states in the 17th and 18th centuries, or in Charles Tillys famous formulation: War made the state and the state made war. For example, the formation of the modern states of Germany and Italy in the 19th century is closely associated with the wars of expansion and consolidation led by Prussia and Sardinia, respectively. Such states are considered weak or fragile. The strong-weak categorization is not the same as Western-non-Western, as some Latin American states like Argentina and Brazil and Middle Eastern states like Egypt and Israel are considered to have strong administrative structures and economic infrastructure. Historically, the international community would have targeted weak states for territorial absorption or colonial domination or, alternatively, such states would fragment into pieces small enough to be effectively administered and secured by a local power. However, international norms towards sovereignty changed in the wake of WWII in ways that support and maintain the existence of weak states. Weak states are given de jure sovereignty equal to that of other states, even when they do not have de facto sovereignty or control of their own territory, including the privileges of international diplomatic recognition and an equal vote in the United Nations. Further, the international community offers development aid to weak states, which helps maintain the facade of a functioning modern state by giving the appearance that the state is capable of fulfilling its implied responsibilities of control and order. The formation of a strong international law regime and norms against territorial aggression is strongly associated with the dramatic drop in the number of interstate wars, though it has also been attributed to the effect of the Cold War or to the changing nature of economic development. Consequently, military aggression that results in territorial annexation became increasingly likely to prompt international condemnation, diplomatic censure, a reduction in international aid or the introduction of economic sanction, or, as in the case of 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, international military intervention to reverse the territorial aggression. Similarly, the international community has largely refused to recognize secessionist regions, while keeping some secessionist self-declared states such as Taiwan in diplomatic recognition limbo. While there is not a large body of academic work examining the relationship, Hironakas statistical study found a correlation that suggests that every major international anti-secessionist declaration increased the number of ongoing civil wars by +10%, or a total +114% from 1945 to 1997. The diplomatic and legal protection given by the international community, as well as economic support to weak governments and discouragement of secession, thus had the unintended effect of encouraging civil wars. There has been an enormous amount of international intervention in civil wars since 1945 that served to extend wars. While intervention has been practiced since the international system has existed, its nature changed substantially. It became common for both the state and opposition group to receive foreign support, allowing wars to continue well past the point when domestic resources had been exhausted. Superpowers, such as the European great powers, had always felt no compunction in intervening in civil wars that affected their interests, while distant regional powers such as the United States could declare the interventionist Monroe Doctrine of 1821 for events in its Central American backyard. However, the large population of weak states after 1945 allowed intervention by former colonial powers, regional powers and neighboring states who themselves often had scarce resources. On average, a civil war with interstate intervention was 300% longer than those without. When disaggregated, a civil war with intervention on only one side is 156% longer, while intervention on both sides lengthens the average civil war by an addition 92%. If one of the intervening states was a superpower, a civil war is extended a further 72%; a conflict such as the Angolan Civil War, in which there is two-sided foreign intervention, including by a superpower, would be 538% longer on average than a civil war without any international intervention. Effect of the Cold War The Cold War provided a global network of material and ideological support that perpetuated civil wars, which were mainly fought in weak ex-colonial states, rather than the relatively strong states that were aligned with the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In some cases, superpowers would superimpose Cold War ideology onto local conflicts, while in others local actors using Cold War ideology would attract the attention of a superpower to obtain support. Using a separate statistical evaluation than used above for interventions, civil wars that included pro- or anti-communist forces lasted 141% longer than the average non-Cold War conflict, while a Cold War civil war that attracted superpower intervention resulted in wars typically lasting over three times as long as other civil wars. Conversely, the end of the Cold War marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 resulted in a reduction in the duration of Cold War civil wars of 92% or, phrased another way, a roughly ten-fold increase in the rate of resolution of Cold War civil wars. Lengthy Cold War-associated civil conflicts that ground to a halt include the wars of Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua . See also The Logic of Violence in Civil War War of Independence Wars of national liberation References

Analysing Biopower And Agency Linked To Euthanasia Philosophy Essay

Analysing Biopower And Agency Linked To Euthanasia Philosophy Essay Human life can be perceived as a way of being that ensures autonomy upon the physical body. However, state authority, surveillance and law are moderating this individual freedom and moral decision-making. Nowadays, euthanasia remains a highly controversial and sensitive medical and ethical issue. My research and final thesis for the master will focus on the narratives of people, residing in houses for the elderly in Antwerp, Belgium. Emphasis is placed on whether upcoming media interest in euthanasia influences elderly thoughts and decision making regarding assisted suicide. Wishes about end-of-life decisions, opinions of relatives and law interpretations of medical practitioners are being investigated in this study. And finally the way governments authority influences peoples agency in end-of-life decision making. With this paper, I intend to widen my knowledge of two main anthropological topics linked to the subject of euthanasia, namely biopower and agency. Biopolitics concern the political implications of social and biological facts and phenomena, with political choice and action directly afflicting all aspects of human life. Agency, on the other hand, can be seen as an alternative attempt to maintain autonomy in ones own life and death, under the influence of the states disciplining interference. Both forms of power are studied in this paper, and their interrelationship is critically viewed. Keywords: Biopolitics, Agency, Power, Health, Ethics 2. The history of biopower In Foucaults The Birth of Biopolitics (Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979), an analysis of liberalism and neoliberalism as forms of biopolitics is presented. According to Foucault, biopower can be perceived as a technology of power, intending to manage individuals as a group. This political technology differentiates because of its ability to control populations as a whole, and is thus essential to the development of modern capitalism (Foucault, 2008). This shift from the managing and micro-controlling of individuals to disciplining a population emerged in the eighteenth-century. Even though this seems as an opportunity to gain more natural rights and liberty for individuals, this liberal government no longer limits state power because of the incompatible tension between freedom and security (Foucault, 2008, McSweeney, 2010). As Foucault argued, liberalism concerns the biopolitical. For liberalism promotes an imagined self-governing of life through a certain capture and disc iplining of natural forces of aggression and desire within the framework of a cultural game, governed by civil conventions and instituted laws (Foucault, 2004). In this conception, life is as much of a cultural construct as is law, although the naturalness of life, thought of as innately self-regulating, is always insinuated. Both in economics and in politics, liberalism rejoice in an order that is supposed to emerge naturally from the clash of passions themselves (Milbank, 2008: 2). Rabinow and Rose seek to enlighten the developments in Foucaults concept of biopower, which serves to bring into view a field comprised of more or less rationalized attempts to intervene upon the vital characteristics of human existence (Rabinow, 2006: 196-197). Foucault distinguishes two poles of biopower: the first one focuses on an anatomo-politics of the human body, seeking to maximize its forces and integrate it into efficient systems. The second pole entails biopolitics of the population, focusing on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanisms of life: birth, morbidity, mortality and longevity (Rose, 2007: 53). Thus, according to Rabinow and Rose, we can use the term biopolitics to embrace all the specific strategies and contestations over problematizations of collective human vitality, morbidity and mortality; over the forms of knowledge, regimes of authority and practices of intervention that are desirable, legitimate and efficacious (Rabinow, 2006: 197). In order to clarify the concept of biopower, three elements must be included. The first one comprises one or more truth discourses about the vital character of living human beings, and an array of authorities considered competent to speak that truth. Secondly, the strategies for intervention upon collective existence in the name of life and health, and lastly, modes of subjectification, through which individuals are brought to work on themselves, under certain forms of authority. Biopolitical analyses also explore how poverty, body commodification, and notions of risk and control are lived and shaped by the intersections of state imperatives, local traditions, and the global reach of medicine (Kaufman, 2005: 320). It is been inextricably bound up with the rise of the life sciences, the human sciences and clinical medicine. It has given birth to techniques, technologies, experts, and apparatuses for the care and administration of the life of each and of all, from town planning to heal th services (Rose, 2007: 54). Nevertheless, we need to be untrammeled by obligations to authoritative states and international bureaucracies, as most crimes against humanity are committed by powerful states (Farmer, 2004: 242). 2.1 Criticism Rabinow and Rose are critical of Agamben (1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2005) and Negri (2000), who suggest that contemporary biopower takes the form of a politics that is fundamentally dependent on the domination, exploitation, expropriation and, in some cases, elimination of the vital existence of some or all subjects over whom it is exercised (Rabinow, 2006: 198). The following fallacies in Agamben and Negris work are mentioned. Firstly, their use of biopower as a totalizing term in which biopower serves to secure the dominion of a global form of domination that they term Empire (ibid.: 198). Rabinow and Rose agree that it is necessary to extend the scope of traditional analyses of economic exploitation and geopolitics in order to grasp the way in which the living character of human being is being harnessed by biocapital. However, this expanded concept of biopower leaves little room for analytical work. Therefore, Rabinow and Rose agree that this version of the concept of biopower is an tithetical to that proposed by Foucault because it can describe everything but analyse nothing. Secondly, Agambens view of the Holocaust as the ultimate exemplar of biopower and use of the obscure metaphor of homo sacer. According to Rabinow and Rose: the power to command under threat of death is exercised by States and their surrogates in multiple instances, in micro forms and in geopolitical relations. But this does not demonstrate that this form of power commands backed up by the ultimate threat of death is the guarantee or underpinning principle of all forms of biopower in contemporary liberal societies. Nor is it useful to use this single diagram to analyse every contemporary instance of thanatopolitics (ibid.: 201). And lastly, Agambens interpretation of contemporary biopolitics as the politics of a State modelled on the figure of the Sovereign, and of all forms of biopolitical authority as agents of that Sovereign. Rabinow and Rose believe that this interpretation fails to notice the dependence of sovereign rule on a fine web of customary conventions, reciprocal obligations and the like in a word, a moral economy [] sovereign power is at one and the same time an element in this moral economy and an attempt to master it (ibid.: 200). States can only rule because of the ways in which they manage to connect themselves to the ever-growing apparatuses of knowledge collection and problematization that formed alongside the state apparatus since the 19th century. Furthermore, in the analysis of biopower, Rabinow and Rose focus on three topics that they believe condense some of the biopolitical lines of force active today. The first one embraces race. At one point, the link between biological understandings of distinctions among population groups and their socio-political implications seemed broken and race was crucial as a socio-economic category, a mark of discrimination and a mode of identification that remained extremely salient socially and politically, from the allocation of federal funds to the manifestations of identity politics. However, at the turn of the new century, race is once again re-entering the domain of biological truth, viewed now through a molecular gaze (ibid.: 206). A new molecular deployment of race has emerged seemingly almost inevitably out of genomic thinking. Funding for research in DNA sequence variations has been justified precisely in biopolitical terms, as leading towards and ensuring the equal health of the pop ulation in all or some of its diversity (ibid.: 207). Rabinow and Rose believe that new challenges for critical thinking are raised by the contemporary interplay between political and genomic classifications of race, identity politics, racism, health inequities, and their potential entry into biomedical truth, commercial logics and the routine practices of health care (ibid.: 207). The second topic entails reproduction. Since the 1970s, sexuality and reproduction have become disentangled, and the question of reproduction gets problematized, both nationally and supra-nationally, because of its economic, ecological and political consequences. Reproduction has been made into a biopolitical space in which an array of connections appear between the individual and the collective, the technological and the political, the legal and the ethical (ibid.: 208). According to Rabinow and Rose the economy of contemporary biopolitics operates according to logics of vitality, not mortality: while it has its circuits of exclusion, letting die is not making die (ibid.: 211). They argue that changes are about capitalism and liberalism and not eugenics. And lastly; genomic medicine. Rabinow and Rose narrate how the first biopolitical strategies concerned the management of illness and health and how these provided a model for many other problematizations operating in terms of the division of the normal and the pathological. This model was popular in liberal societies because they establish links between the molecular and the molar, linking the aspiration of the individual to be cured to the management of the health status of the population as a whole (ibid.: 212). Whether or not genomic medicine will lead to the creation of a new regime of biopower depends on both the uncertain outcome of genomic research itself, and on contingencies external to genomics and biomedicine. If the new model of genomic medicine were to succeed, and to be deployed widely, not only in the developed but also in the less developed world, the logics of medicine, and the shape of the biopolitical field, would be altered. New contestations would emerge over acc ess to such technologies and the resources necessary to follow through their implications. Additionally, as the forms of knowledge generated here are those of probability, new ways of calculating risk, understanding the self and organizing health care would undoubtedly emerge (Rabinow, 2006: 214). It is important to see that in this, the political and social implications are shaped more by the political side of biopolitics than the medical side, which is also mentioned by Vaughn (2010). Milbank (2008) is discussing this topic from an alternative point of view. Laws typically proceed from sovereign power granted legitimacy through a general popular consent as mediated by representation. In so far as such a procedure is taken to be normative, it can be seen as embodying a natural law for the origin of legitimate power from the conflicts in human life (Milbank, 2008: 5). To conclude; within the field of biopower, the term biopolitics is used to embrace all the specific strategies and contestations over problematizations of collective human vitality, morbidity and mortality, and can therefore be linked to the implementation of the euthanasia law. It includes a form of power expressed as a control that extends throughout the depths of the consciousnesses and bodies of the population (Rose, 2007: 54). At the end of life, ethnographers have focused their attention in the distinction between the social and biological death of the person and the practical and ethical quandaries created by the late modern ability and desire to authorize and design ones own death, and the ways in which death is spoken, silenced, embraced, staved off, and otherwise patterned (Kaufman, 2005: 319). The policy of euthanasia can thereby be seen as an array of authorities considered competent to judge a humans quality of life. In one sense, to say that the sovereign has a right of life and death means that he can, basically, either have people put to death of let them live, of in any case that life and death are not natural or immediate phenomena which are primal or radical, and which fall outside the field of power. [à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦] In any case, the lives and death of subjects become rights only as a result of the will of the sovereign (Foucault, 1997: 24). 3. Agency In the previous chapter it has become clear that biopolitics can be perceived as an empowered discipline which reduces humans to mere life and biological statistics and processes. But has a human being no other destiny then to be at the mercy of the puppet master called the state? According to Mahmood (2005), it is quite clear that the idea of freedom and liberty as the political ideal is relatively new in modern history. Nor, for that matter, does the narrative of individual and collective liberty exhaust the desires with which people live in liberal societies? How do we then analyze operations of power that construct different kinds of bodies, knowledges, and subjectivities whose trajectories do not follow the entelechy of libratory politics? It encourages us to conceptualize agency not simple as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create and enable (Mahmood, 2005, 22). Ortner believes agency and social power are very closely linked. In her article Power and Projects: Reflections on Agency (2006), she agrees with Ahearn that oppositional agency is only one of many forms of agency and that domination and resistance are not irrelevant, but that human emotions, and hence questions of agency, within relations of power and inequality are always complex and contradictory (Ortner, 2006: 137). She also mentions Giddens viewpoint that the concept of action is logically tied to that of power because of its transformative capacity, but that the transformative capacity of agents is only one dimension of how power operates in social systems. Ortner sees agency as part of her theory on serious games. The concept of serious games is grounded in practice theory, because as in practice theory social life in a serious games perspective is seen as something that is actively played, oriented toward culturally constituted goals and projects, and involving both routine practices and intentionalized action (129). However, it moves beyond this in looking at more complex relations, namely power, and more complex dimensions of subjectivity, those involving intentionality and agency. Although agency is considered universal, the agency exercised by different persons is far from uniform and differs enormously in both kind and extent. At the ethnographic level, however, what is at stake is a contrast between the workings of agency within massive power relations. In the most common usage agency can be virtually synonymous with the forms of power people have at their disposal, thereby implying that people in positions of power have a lot of agency. On the other hand, Ortner notes that the dominated too also have certain capacities, and sometimes very significant capacities, to exercise some sort of influence over the ways in which events unfold. Resistance is then also a form of power-agency (ibid.: 144). Thus, Ortner believes that the less powerful seek to nourish and protect by creating or protecting sites on the margins of power. These cultural projects can be simple goals for individuals, related to intention and desire, but many projects are full-blown serious games, involving the intense play of multiply positioned subjects pursuing cultural goals within a matrix of local inequalities and power differentials (ibid.: 144). Agency becomes the pursuit of (cultural) projects, but it is also ordinary life socially organized in terms of culturally constituted projects that infuse life with meaning and purpose. Hence, the agency of projects is not necessarily about domination and resistance; it is more about people having desires that grow out of their own structures of life. Ortner views this as people playing their own serious games in the face of more powerful parties seeking to destruct these. So this is not free agency, as the cultural desires or intentions [] emerge from structur ally defined differences of social categories and differentials of power (ibid.: 145). To Ortner, the point of making the distinction between agency-in-the-sense-of-power and an agency-in-the-sense-of-(the pursuit of) projects is that the first is organized around the axis of domination and resistance, and thus defined to a great extent by the terms of the dominant party, while the second is defined by local logics of the good and the desirable and how to pursue them (ibid.: 145). She considers that the agency which is involved in significant cultural end, is inevitably involving internal power-relations. Consequently, the agency of project intrinsically hinges on the agency of power. 3.1 The free individual? The ultimate purpose of the serious games theory is always to understand the larger forces, formations, and transformations of social life. The way Ortner sees social agents is that they are always involved in, and can never act outside of, the multiplicity of social relations in which they are enmeshed (ibid.: 130). Thus while all social actors have agency, because of their engagement with others in the play of serious games they can never be free agents. This social embeddedness of agents takes two forms; the first one being relations of solidarity among friends and family. The second form involves relations of power, inequality and competition. Ortner emphasizes that agency is never a thing in itself but is always a part of a process of what Giddens calls structuration, the making and remaking of larger social and cultural formations (ibid.: 134). Ortner admits the dangers of overemphasizing agency as this gives precedence to individuals over context and that too much focus on the agency of individuals and/or groups results in a gross oversimplification of the processes involved in history, thereby ignoring both the needs and desires of human beings and the pulse of collective forces and losing sight of the complex, and highly unpredictable, relationship between intentions and outcomes. However, Ortner believes the solution is the framework of practice theory within which neither individuals nor social forces have precedence, but in which nonetheless there is a dynamic, powerful, and sometimes transformative relationship between the practices of real people and the structures of society, culture, and history (ibid.:133). Furthermore, Ortner believes that agency can be said to have two fields of meaning, one being about intentionality and the pursuit of (culturally defined) projects), the other about power, about acting within relations of social inequality, asymmetry, and force (ibid.: 139). However, agency is never merely one or the other. Intentionality refers to a wide range of states, both cognitive and emotional, and at various levels of consciousness, that are directed forward toward some end (ibid.: 134). There exists a continuum between both soft and hard definitions of agency. In soft definitions, intentionality is not taken into account or not seen as being consciously held in the mind. However, what is then the distinction between agency and routine practices? On the other end of the spectrum, and Ortner shares this viewpoint, are those definitions of agency that emphasize the strong role of active intentionality in agency that differentiates agency from routine practices. Pre-modern thought did not conceive of agency solely in terms of individual freedom or else in terms of explicit representative sovereign action leaving a consequent problem of the apparent spontaneous patterning of the unplanned. This was because it did not think of an act as primarily an expression of freedom or as something owned by the individual or the sovereigns will or motivation. Instead, it paid more attention to the fact that every act is always pre-positioned within a relational public realm and in turn cannot avoid in some way modifying that realm, beyond anything that could in principle be consented to by the other, since the full content of any act is unpredictable (Milbank, 2008: 23). In conclusion, Ortner advocates that a distinction should be made between agency as a form of power (agency of power) and agency as a form of intention and desire, as the pursuit of goals and the enactment of projects (agency of projects). While they form two distinct fields of meaning, they are also interrelated as both domination and resistance are always in the service of projects. Thus, agency is a complex term whose senses emerge within semantic and institutional networks that define and make possible particular ways of relation to people, things, and oneself. Yet, intention , which is variously glossed as plan, awareness, willfulness, directedness, or desire is often made to be central to the attribution of agency. Although the various usages of agency have very different implications that do not all hang together, cultural theory tends to reduce them to the metaphysical idea of a conscious agent-subject having both the capacity and the desire to move in a singular historical d irection: that of increasing self-empowerment and decreasing pain (Asad, 2003: 78-79). 4. Conclusion After thoroughly having examined both the subjects of biopower and agency, and following the course Theory and Practice, awareness has grown once again in realizing how much ones been lived. Disciplining of the state interferes in such a wide array of human life; consisting of for example the school system, employment, medicines and ultimately death. It becomes clear that agency, performed in ways we have discussed in class, simply does not exist, because of the dominant and prevailing power of the state. It is not owned by social actors, but interactively negotiated and best seen as a disposition toward the enactment of projects. Despite of this negotiating, individuals never become free agents. This and other research shows that the law and the policy of euthanasia influencing peoples right to determine their own life. Today, most requests for euthanasia to end a life with dignity are denied, because people do not fit into the criteria and the so-called carefully requirements the l aw states. But to what extend do such institutions of power have the moral right to determine and monitor personal decisions of individuals? As Foucault (2003) states: the very essence of the right of life and death is actually the right to kill: it is at the moment when the sovereign can kill that he exercises his right over life. In my opinion people should maintain autonomy over their own life and death, and that the government should not intervene from above into such personal, subjective and fundamental choice. However, apart from the awareness of the fundamental mediation of the state, we remain political animals. In the end, everyone wants to pursuit personal goals in life, and in order to accomplish those, we cannot do much more than just put up with the fate of being obliged well-behaved citizen.

Sonnet 69 :: essays research papers fc

Sonnet 65 (Shakespeare) 1 Since brass, nor stone, nor boundless sea, 2 But sad mortality o’er-sways their power, 3 How with this rage shall beauty hold a plea, 4 Whose action is no stronger than a flower? 5 O how shall summer’s honey breath hold out, 6 Against the wreckful siege of batt’ring days 7 When rocks impregnable are not so stout, 8 Nor gates of steel so strong, but time decays? 9 O fearful meditation! Where, alack, 10 Shall time’s best jewel from time’s chest lie hid? 11 Or what strong hand can hold his swift foot back, 12 Or who his spoil o’er beauty can forbid? 13 O none, unless this miracle have might: 14  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  That in black ink my love may still shine bright. Withstanding Mortality through Verse Melissa Zyduck Explication #1 Sonnet 65 Carducci Feb. 21st, 2001 Sonnets are rhymed poems consisting of fourteen lines, the first eight making up the octet and the last six lines being the sestet. The basic structure of the sonnet arose in medieval Italy, its most prominent exponent being the Early Renaissance poet, Petrarch. The appearance of the English Sonnet, however, occurred when Shakespeare was an adolescent, around 1580 (Moore and Charmaine 1). Although it is named after him, Shakespeare did not originate the English sonnet form. The English sonnet differs slightly from the Italian, or Petrarchian, Sonnet and the Spenserian Sonnet in that it ends with a rhymed couplet and follows the rhyme scheme (abab cdcd efef gg). Thus, the octet/sestet structure can be alternatively divided into three quatrains with alternating rhymes and ending in a rhymed couplet. William Shakespeare’s Sonnet 65 is part of a sequence of one hundred and fifty-four sonnets allegedly written sometime between 1592 and May of 1609 (Duncan 13; Moore and Charmine 1). In sonnets 1 through 126, the speaker addresses a young man often referred to as the Youth, and in sonnets 127 through 154, a woman, or Dark Lady, is addressed Sonnet 65 is also part of a unit with Sonnet 64 (Best 1), the two coming together to form their own â€Å"fearful meditation† (9) on time and ruin reaping youth and beauty from the world and leaving only cold death (Cooney 3). Shakespeare opens the poem with the speaker listing paradigms of the long-lasting substances â€Å"brass† and â€Å"stone† (1). â€Å"Earth† and â€Å"boundless sea† (1) are also long lasting, but are superior in that they are nearly limitless in extent. All of these elements, by their nature, should be capable of holding out against â€Å"sad mortality† (2), but none of them are free of its operations (Duncan, 240) as it â€Å"o’er-sways their power† (2).